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Poliomyelitis Prevention in the United States
Updated Recommendations of the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
Summary
These recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) for poliomyelitis prevention replace those issued in 1997. As of
January 1, 2000, ACIP recommends exclusive use of inactivated poliovirus
vaccine (IPV) for routine childhood polio vaccination in the United States. All
children should receive four doses of IPV at ages 2, 4, and 6–18 months and 4–6
years. Oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) should be used only in certain
circumstances, which are detailed in these recommendations. Since 1979, the
only indigenous cases of polio reported in the United States have been
associated with the use of the live OPV. Until recently, the benefits of OPV use
(i.e., intestinal immunity, secondary spread) outweighed the risk for vaccine-
associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) (i.e., one case among 2.4 million
vaccine doses distributed). In 1997, to decrease the risk for VAPP but maintain the
benefits of OPV, ACIP recommended replacing the all-OPV schedule with a
sequential schedule of IPV followed by OPV. Since 1997, the global polio
eradication initiative has progressed rapidly, and the likelihood of poliovirus
importation into the United States has decreased substantially. In addition, the
sequential schedule has been well accepted. No declines in childhood
immunization coverage were observed, despite the need for additional
injections. On the basis of these data, ACIP recommended on June 17, 1999, an
all-IPV schedule for routine childhood polio vaccination in the United States to
eliminate the risk for VAPP. ACIP reaffirms its support for the global polio
eradication initiative and the use of OPV as the only vaccine recommended to
eradicate polio from the remaining countries where polio is endemic.
INTRODUCTION
As a result of the introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in the 1950s,
followed by oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in the 1960s, poliomyelitis control has been
achieved in numerous countries worldwide, including the entire Western Hemisphere
(1,2 ). In the United States, the last indigenously acquired cases of polio caused by wild
poliovirus were detected in 1979 (3 ). In 1985, the countries of the Americas* estab-
lished a goal of regional elimination of wild poliovirus by 1990 (4 ). In 1988, the World
*Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States of America,
Uruguay, Venezuela, United Kingdom Virgin Islands, and United States Virgin Islands.
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Health Assembly (WHA), which is the directing council of the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO), adopted the goal of global polio eradication by the end of 2000 (5 ). In the
Americas, the last case of polio associated with isolation of wild poliovirus was de-
tected in Peru in 1991 (6 ). The Western Hemisphere was certified as free from indig-
enous wild poliovirus in 1994, an accomplishment achieved by the exclusive use of
OPV (7 ). The global polio eradication initiative has reduced the number of reported
polio cases worldwide by >80% since the mid-1980s, and worldwide eradication of the
disease by the end of 2000 or soon after appears feasible (8 ).
Summary of Recent Polio Vaccination Policy
in the United States
Based on the continued occurrence of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis
(VAPP) in the United States, the absence of indigenous disease, and the sharply de-
creased risk for wild poliovirus importation into the United States, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommended in June 1996 a change from an
all-OPV schedule for routine childhood poliovirus vaccination to a sequential IPV-OPV
vaccination schedule (i.e., two doses of IPV at ages 2 and 4 months, followed by two
doses of OPV at ages 12–18 months and 4–6 years). These recommendations were
officially accepted by CDC and published in January 1997 (9 ). The sequential schedule
was intended to be a transition policy in place for 3–5 years until eventual adoption of
an all-IPV schedule. At the same time that ACIP recommended a sequential schedule,
the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the American Academy of Family Phy-
sicians (AAFP) recommended expanded use of IPV, with all-OPV, all-IPV, and sequential
IPV-OPV as equally acceptable options (10,11 ).
After the successful implementation of expanded IPV use without any observed
declines in childhood immunization coverage (12,13 ), AAP and AAFP joined ACIP in
January 1999 in recommending that the first two doses of polio vaccine for routine
vaccination be IPV in most circumstances (14,15 ). However, an all-IPV schedule was
still needed to eliminate the risk for VAPP while maintaining population immunity. Thus,
ACIP recommended in June 1999 that the all-IPV schedule begin January 1, 2000 (16 ).
Although AAFP concurred with this recommendation, AAP recommended only that the
all-IPV schedule begin during the first 6 months of 2000 (17,18 ).
The United States can remain free of polio only by maintaining high levels of popu-
lation immunity and reducing or eliminating the risk for poliovirus importation. ACIP
strongly reaffirms its support for the global polio eradication initiative, which relies on
OPV in countries where the disease has recently been endemic. This report provides
the scientific and programmatic background for transition to an all-IPV schedule, pre-
sents the current recommendations for polio prevention in the United States, and sum-
marizes recommendations for OPV use if the U.S. vaccine stockpile is needed for out-
break control.




Poliomyelitis is a highly contagious infectious disease caused by poliovirus, an en-
terovirus. Most poliovirus infections are asymptomatic. Symptomatic cases are typi-
cally characterized by two phases — the first, a nonspecific febrile illness, is followed
(in a small percentage of cases) by aseptic meningitis or paralytic disease. The ratio of
cases of inapparent infection to paralytic disease ranges from 100:1 to 1,000:1.
After a person is exposed to poliovirus, the virus replicates in the oropharynx and
the intestinal tract. Viremia follows, which can result in infection of the central nervous
system. Replication of poliovirus in motor neurons of the anterior horn and brain stem
results in cell destruction and causes the typical clinical manifestations of paralytic
polio. Depending on the sites of paralysis, polio can be classified as spinal, bulbar, or
spino-bulbar disease. Progression to maximum paralysis is rapid (2–4 days), is usually
associated with fever and muscle pain, and rarely continues after the patient’s tem-
perature has returned to normal. Spinal paralysis is typically asymmetric and more
severe proximally than distally. Deep tendon reflexes are absent or diminished. Bulbar
paralysis can compromise respiration and swallowing. Paralytic polio is fatal in 2%–
10% of cases. After the acute episode, many patients recover at least some muscle
function and prognosis for recovery can usually be established within 6 months after
onset of paralytic manifestations.
Post-Polio Syndrome
After 30–40 years, 25%–40% of persons who contracted paralytic polio during child-
hood can experience muscle pain and exacerbation of existing weakness or develop
new weakness or paralysis. This disease entity, called post-polio syndrome, has been
reported only in persons infected during the era of wild poliovirus circulation. Risk
factors for post-polio syndrome include a) the passage of more time since acute polio-
virus infection, b) the presence of permanent residual impairment after recovery from
the acute illness, and c) being female (19 ).
Epidemiology
Polio is caused by three serotypes of poliovirus — types 1, 2, and 3. In countries
where poliovirus is still endemic, paralytic disease is most often caused by poliovirus
type 1, less frequently by poliovirus type 3, and least frequently by poliovirus type 2.
The virus is transmitted from person to person primarily by direct fecal-oral contact.
However, the virus also can be transmitted by indirect contact with infectious saliva or
feces, or by contaminated sewage or water.
The first paralytic manifestations of polio usually occur 7–21 days from the time of
initial infection (range: 4–30 days). The period of communicability begins after the virus
replicates and is excreted in the oral secretions and feces. This period ends with the
termination of viral replication and excretion, usually 4–6 weeks after infection. After
household exposure to wild poliovirus, >90% of susceptible contacts become infected.
Poliovirus infection results in lifelong immunity specific to the infecting viral serotype.
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Humans are the only reservoir for poliovirus. Long-term carrier states (i.e., excre-
tion of virus by asymptomatic persons >6 months after infection) are rare and have
been reported only in immunodeficient persons (20,21 ). Risk factors for paralytic dis-
ease include larger inocula of poliovirus, increasing age, pregnancy, strenuous exer-
cise, tonsillectomy, and intramuscular injections administered while the patient is in-
fected with poliovirus (22–24 ).
Secular Trends in Disease and Vaccination Coverage in the United States
In the United States, poliovirus vaccines have eliminated polio caused by wild polio-
virus. The annual number of reported cases of paralytic disease declined from >20,000
in 1952 to an average of 8–9 cases annually during 1980–1994 (Figure) (3,25,26 ). Dur-
ing 1980–1998, a total of 152 cases of paralytic polio were reported, including 144 cases
of VAPP, six imported cases, and two indeterminate cases (16 ). Until worldwide polio
eradication is achieved, epidemics caused by importation of wild virus to the United
States remain a possibility unless population immunity is maintained by vaccinating
children early in their first year of life. In the United States, outbreaks of polio occurred
in 1970, 1972, and 1979 after wild poliovirus was introduced into susceptible popula-
tions that had low levels of vaccination coverage. Vaccination coverage among chil-
dren in the United States is at the highest level in history because of ongoing immuni-
zation initiatives. Assessments of the vaccination status of children entering kindergar-
ten and first grade indicated that 95% had completed primary vaccination against polio
during the 1980–81 school year, and rates continue to be above that level.
Coverage levels among preschool-aged children are lower than the levels at school
entry, but have increased substantially in recent years. Nationally, representative vacci-
nation coverage rates among children aged 19–35 months are derived from the Na-
tional Immunization Survey (NIS). Vaccination coverage with at least three doses of
poliovirus vaccine among children in this age group increased from 88% in 1995 to 91%
in 1996 and remained >90% in 1997 and 1998 (13 ).
FIGURE. Total number of reported paralytic poliomyelitis cases and total number of
reported vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) cases — United States, 1960–1998*
*Updated June 16, 1999.
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Serosurveys have identified high levels of population immunity consistent with these
high coverage rates. Based on data from selected surveys, >90% of children, adoles-
cents, and young adults had detectable antibodies to poliovirus types 1 and 2, and
>85% had antibody to type 3 (27,28 ). Data from seroprevalence surveys conducted in
two inner-city areas of the United States during 1990–1991 documented that >80% of
all children aged 12–47 months had antibodies to all three poliovirus serotypes. Of the
children who had received at least three doses of OPV, 90% had antibodies to all three
serotypes (29 ). A serosurvey conducted during 1997–1998 among low-income chil-
dren aged 19–35 months living in four U.S. cities reported that 96.8%, 99.8%, and 94.5%
were seropositive to poliovirus types 1, 2, and 3, respectively (30 ).
Both laboratory surveillance for enteroviruses and surveillance for polio cases sug-
gest that endemic circulation of indigenous wild polioviruses ceased in the United States
in the 1960s. During the 1970s, genotypic testing (e.g., molecular sequencing or oligo-
nucleotide fingerprinting) of poliovirus isolates obtained from indigenous cases (both
sporadically occurring and outbreak-associated) in the United States indicated that these
viruses were imported (31 ). During the 1980s, five cases of polio were classified as
imported. The last imported case, reported in 1993, occurred in a child aged 2 years
who was a resident of Nigeria; the child had been brought to New York for treatment of
paralytic disease acquired in her home country. Laboratory investigations failed to iso-
late poliovirus among samples taken from this child after she arrived in the United
States.
Recent experience in Canada illustrates the continuing potential for importation of
wild poliovirus into the United States until global eradication is achieved. In 1993 and
1996, health officials in Canada isolated wild poliovirus in stool samples from residents
of Alberta and Ontario. No cases of paralytic polio occurred as a result of these wild
virus importations. The strain isolated in 1993 was linked epidemiologically and by
genomic sequencing to a 1992 polio outbreak in the Netherlands (32 ). The isolate ob-
tained in 1996 was from a child who had recently visited India (33 ).
Inapparent infection with wild poliovirus no longer contributes to either the estab-
lishment or maintenance of poliovirus immunity in the United States because these
viruses no longer circulate in the population. Thus, universal vaccination of infants and
children is the only way to establish and maintain population immunity against polio.
Polio Eradication
After the widespread use of poliovirus vaccine in the mid-1950s, the incidence of
polio declined rapidly in many industrialized countries. In the United States, the num-
ber of cases of paralytic polio reported each year declined from >20,000 cases in 1952
to <100 cases in the mid-1960s (3 ). In 1988, the WHA resolved to eradicate polio glo-
bally by 2000 (5 ). This global resolution followed the regional goal to eliminate polio
by 1990, set in 1985 by the countries of the Western Hemisphere. The last case of polio
associated with wild poliovirus isolation was reported from Peru in 1991, and the entire
Western Hemisphere was certified as free from indigenous wild poliovirus by an Inter-
national Certification Commission in 1994 (7 ). The following polio eradication strate-
gies, which were developed for the Americas, were adopted for worldwide implemen-
tation in all polio-endemic countries (34 ):
● Achieve and maintain high vaccination coverage with at least three doses of OPV
among infants aged <1 year.
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● Develop sensitive systems of epidemiologic and laboratory surveillance,
including acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance.
● Administer supplemental doses of OPV to all young children (usually those aged
<5 years) during National Immunization Days (NIDs) to rapidly decrease
widespread poliovirus circulation.
● Conduct mopping-up vaccination campaigns (i.e., localized campaigns that
include home-to-home [or boat-to-boat] administration of OPV) in areas at high
risk to eliminate the last remaining chains of poliovirus transmission.
In 1998, global coverage with at least three doses of OPV among infants aged <1
year was 80%. All WHO regions* reported coverage rates of >80%, except the African
Region (AFR), where coverage improved from 32% in 1988 to 53% in 1998 (8 ). Also in
1998, a total of 90 countries conducted either NIDs (74 countries) or Sub-National Im-
munization Days (16 countries). These 90 countries provided supplemental doses of
OPV to approximately 470 million children aged <5 years (i.e., approximately three
quarters of the world’s children aged <5 years) (8 ). In 1999, NIDs were conducted in all
50 polio-endemic countries. NIDs in the AFR targeted approximately 88 million chil-
dren aged <5 years (35 ). Synchronized NIDs were conducted in 18 countries of the
European Region (EUR) and Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMR), vaccinating 58 mil-
lion children aged <5 years. Another 257 million children aged <5 years were vacci-
nated in December 1998 and January 1999 in countries of the EMR (Pakistan), South
East Asia Region (SEAR) (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Thailand),
and Western Pacific Region (WPR) (China and Vietnam) (36–40 ). NIDs in India reached
134 million children, representing the largest mass campaigns conducted to date. Each
round of NIDs in India was conducted in only one day (41 ). Mopping-up campaigns
have been conducted widely in the countries of the Americas (including Brazil, Colom-
bia, Mexico, Peru, and several countries in Central America) and more recently in the
Mekong delta area encompassing Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in 1997 and 1998, and
in Turkey in 1998 (37,38 ).
These supplemental immunization activities have been successful in decreasing the
number of reported polio cases globally from 35,251 in 1988 (when the polio eradica-
tion target was adopted) to 6,227 in 1998, a decrease of 82% (8 ). This decrease in
incidence is even more remarkable considering the progress in implementing sensitive
systems for AFP surveillance, which substantially increased the completeness of re-
porting of suspected or confirmed polio cases. To conduct virological surveillance, a
global laboratory network has been established that processes stool specimens in WHO-
accredited laboratories, with both quality and performance monitored closely (42 ).
Concurrent with the decline in polio incidence, the number of polio-endemic coun-
tries has decreased from >120 in 1988 to approximately 50 in 1998. Approximately 50%
of the world’s population resides in areas now considered polio-free, including the
Western Hemisphere, WPR (which encompasses China), and EUR. Two large endemic
areas of continued poliovirus transmission exist in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Priority countries targeted for accelerated implementation of polio eradication strate-
gies include seven reservoir countries (Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
*African Region (AFR), Region of the Americas (AMR), Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMR),
European Region (EUR), South East Asia Region (SEAR), and Western Pacific Region (WPR).
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Ethiopia, India, Nepal, Nigeria, and Pakistan) and eight countries in conflict (Afghani-
stan, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,
and Tajikistan) (8 ). Progress in these countries will be essential to achieve the goal of
global polio eradication by the end of 2000.
Vaccine-Associated Paralytic Poliomyelitis (VAPP)
Cases of VAPP were observed almost immediately after the introduction of live,
attenuated poliovirus vaccines (43,44 ). Before the sequential IPV-OPV schedule was
introduced, 132 cases of VAPP were reported during 1980–1995 (Figure) (26; CDC, un-
published data, 2000). Fifty-two cases of paralysis occurred among otherwise healthy
vaccine recipients, 41 cases occurred among healthy close contacts of vaccine recipi-
ents, and 7 cases occurred among persons classified as community contacts (i.e., per-
sons from whom vaccine-related poliovirus was isolated but who had not been vacci-
nated recently or been in direct contact with vaccine recipients). An additional 32 cases
occurred among persons with immune system abnormalities who received OPV or
who had direct contact with an OPV recipient (Table).
The overall risk for VAPP is approximately one case in 2.4 million doses of OPV
vaccine distributed, with a first-dose risk of one case in 750,000 first doses distributed
(Table). Among immunocompetent persons, 83% of cases among vaccine recipients
and 63% of cases among contacts occurred after administration of the first dose (Table)
(3,25,36 ). Among persons who are not immunodeficient, the risk for VAPP associated
with the first dose of OPV is sevenfold to 21-fold higher than the risk associated with
subsequent doses (25 ). Immunodeficient persons, particularly those who have B-lym-
phocyte disorders that inhibit synthesis of immune globulins (i.e., agammaglobuline-
mia and hypogammaglobulinemia), are at greatest risk for VAPP (i.e., 3,200-fold to 6,800-
fold greater risk than immunocompetent OPV recipients) (45 ).
Since implementation of the sequential IPV-OPV schedule in 1997, five cases of VAPP
with onset in 1997 and two cases with onset in 1998 were confirmed. Three of these
cases were associated with administration of the first or second dose of OPV to children
TABLE. Ratio of the number and type of cases of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomy-
elitis (VAPP) to the number of doses of trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV)* distrib-
uted — United States, 1980–1995
Ratio of VAPP cases to doses of OPV distributed†
(and number of VAPP cases)
Case category All doses First doses Subsequent doses
Recipient 1: 6.1 (52) 1: 1.4 (43) 1: 28.9 (9)
Contact 1: 7.7 (41) 1: 2.3 (26) 1: 17.3 (15)
Community-acquired 1: 45.3 (7) NA NA
Immunologically abnormal§ 1: 9.9 (32) 1: 5.1 (12) 1: 13.0 (20)
Total 1: 2.4 (132) 1: 0.75 (81) 1: 5.1 (51)
*Live, attenuated vaccine.
†In millions.
§Because the denominator is doses of OPV distributed, the calculated ratio is low. However, if the denominator is
the number of immunodeficient infants born each year, the risk for VAPP among immunodeficient infants is
3,200-fold to 6,800-fold higher than among immunocompetent infants (Sutter RW, Prevots DR. Vaccine-associ-
ated paralytic poliomyelitis among immunodeficient persons. Infect Med 1994;11:426,429–30,435–8).
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who had not previously received IPV, and one of the 1998 cases was associated with
administration of the third dose. Although these data suggest a decline in VAPP after
introduction of the sequential schedule, continued monitoring with additional observa-
tion time is required to confirm these preliminary findings because of potential delays
in reporting (25,46 ).
Transition to an All-IPV Schedule
Adopting an all-IPV schedule for routine childhood polio vaccination in the United
States is intended to eliminate the risk for VAPP. However, this schedule requires two
additional injections at ages 6–18 months and 4–6 years because no combination vac-
cine that includes IPV as a component is licensed in the United States. Because of
concerns regarding potential declines in childhood immunization coverage after intro-
duction of the sequential IPV-OPV schedule (which required two additional injections at
ages 2 and 4 months), several evaluations were conducted during this transition pe-
riod. No evidence exists that childhood vaccination coverage declined because of these
additional injections. In two West Coast health maintenance organizations (HMOs) with
automated recording and tracking systems for vaccination, researchers assessed the
up-to-date vaccination status of infants at age 12 months (i.e., two doses of poliovirus
vaccine, three doses of diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine
[DTaP], two doses of Haemophilus influenzae type b vaccine [Hib], and two doses of
hepatitis B vaccine [HepB]). The proportion of children who started the routine vaccina-
tion schedule with IPV ranged from 36%–98% across the HMOs by the third quarter of
1997. Infants starting with IPV were as likely to be up-to-date as were infants starting
with OPV (12 ).
Available data from other public-sector clinics showed similar results. In one inner-
city clinic in Philadelphia, 152 children due for their first dose of polio vaccine received
IPV. Of the 145 children who returned to the clinic, 144 received a second dose of IPV.
More than 99% of children due for their third and fourth injections (including IPV) dur-
ing a single visit received them as indicated (47 ). An evaluation conducted at six public
health clinics in one Georgia county also concluded that, of 567 infants who received
their first dose of polio vaccine by age 3 months, 534 (94%) received IPV. Among these
infants, 99.6% were also up-to-date for their first doses of diphtheria and tetanus tox-
oids vaccine (DTP), DTaP, Hib, and HepB (48 ). More detailed data on compliance with
the recommended vaccination schedules is available from state immunization regis-
tries.
Another study reviewed immunization data from children born in Oklahoma during
January 1, 1996–June 30, 1997 (i.e., 36,391 children seen at one of 290 facilities). The
percentage of children who received IPV as their first dose of polio vaccine increased
from <2% of children born in 1996 to 15% of children born in the first quarter of 1997
and to 30% of children born in the second quarter of 1997. However, receipt of IPV did
not impact overall vaccination coverage; 80% of children receiving IPV for their first
dose were up-to-date, as were 80% of children receiving OPV (49 ).
In 1995, a total of 448,030 doses of IPV were distributed (i.e., approximately 2% of
total poliovirus vaccine doses) in the United States. IPV use increased from 6% of all
polio doses distributed in 1996 to 29% in 1997 and 34% in 1998. Through August 31,
1999, a total of 69% of doses purchased were IPV, indicating increased acceptance of
IPV (18 ).
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INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING OF SUSPECTED
POLIOMYELITIS CASES
Case Investigation
Each suspected case of polio should prompt an immediate epidemiologic investiga-
tion with collection of laboratory specimens as appropriate (see Laboratory Methods).
If evidence suggests the transmission of wild poliovirus, an active search for other
cases that could have been misdiagnosed initially (e.g., as Guillain-Barré syndrome
[GBS], polyneuritis, or transverse myelitis) should be conducted. Control measures (in-
cluding an OPV vaccination campaign to contain further transmission) should be insti-
tuted immediately. If evidence suggests vaccine-related poliovirus, no vaccination plan
should be developed because no outbreaks associated with live, attenuated vaccine-
related poliovirus strains have been documented.
The two most recent outbreaks of polio reported in the United States affected mem-
bers of religious groups who object to vaccination (i.e., outbreaks occurred in 1972
among Christian Scientists and in 1979 among members of an Amish community).
Polio should be suspected in any case of acute flaccid paralysis that affects an unvacci-
nated member of such a religious group. All such cases should be investigated promptly
(see Surveillance).
Surveillance
CDC conducts national surveillance for polio in collaboration with state and local
health departments. Suspected cases of polio must be reported immediately to local or
state health departments. CDC compiles and summarizes clinical, epidemiologic, and
laboratory data concerning suspected cases. Three independent experts review the
data and determine whether a suspected case meets the clinical case definition of para-
lytic polio (i.e., a paralytic illness clinically and epidemiologically compatible with polio
in which a neurologic deficit is present 60 days after onset of symptoms [unless death
has occurred or follow-up status is unknown]). CDC classifies confirmed cases of para-
lytic polio as a) associated with either vaccine administration or wild virus exposure,
based on epidemiologic and laboratory criteria, and b) occurring in either a vaccine
recipient or the contact of a recipient, based on OPV exposure data (25 ). For the recom-
mended control measures to be undertaken quickly, a preliminary assessment must
ascertain as soon as possible whether a suspected case is likely vaccine-associated or
caused by wild virus (see Case Investigation and Laboratory Methods).
Laboratory Methods
Specimens for virus isolation (e.g, stool, throat swab, and cerebrospinal fluid [CSF])
and serologic testing must be obtained in a timely manner. The greatest yield for polio-
virus is from stool culture, and timely collection of stool specimens increases the likeli-
hood of case confirmation. At least two stool specimens and two throat swab speci-
mens should be obtained from patients who are suspected to have polio. Specimens
should be obtained at least 24 hours apart as early in the course of illness as possible,
ideally within 14 days of onset. Stool specimens collected >2 months after the onset of
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paralytic manifestations are unlikely to yield poliovirus. Throat swabs are less often
positive than stool samples, and virus is rarely detected in CSF. In addition, an acute-
phase serologic specimen should be obtained as early in the course of illness as pos-
sible, and a convalescent-phase specimen should be obtained at least 3 weeks later.
The following tests should be performed on appropriate specimens collected from
persons who have suspected cases of polio: a) isolation of poliovirus in tissue culture;
b) serotyping of a poliovirus isolate as serotype 1, 2, or 3; and c) intratypic differentia-
tion using DNA/RNA probe hybridization or polymerase chain reaction to determine
whether a poliovirus isolate is associated with a vaccine or wild virus.
Acute-phase and convalescent-phase serum specimens should be tested for neu-
tralizing antibody to each of the three poliovirus serotypes. A fourfold rise in antibody
titer between appropriately timed acute-phase and convalescent-phase serum speci-
mens is diagnostic for poliovirus infection. The recently revised standard protocol for
poliovirus serology should be used (50 ). Commercial laboratories usually perform
complement fixation and other tests. However, assays other than neutralization are
difficult to interpret because of inadequate standardization and relative insensitivity.
The CDC Enterovirus Laboratory is available for consultation and will test specimens
from patients who have suspected polio (i.e., patients with acute paralytic manifesta-
tions). The telephone number for this lab is (404) 639-2749.
INACTIVATED POLIOVIRUS VACCINE (IPV)
Background
IPV was introduced in the United States in 1955 and was used widely until OPV
became available in the early 1960s. Thereafter, the use of IPV rapidly declined to <2%
of all poliovirus vaccine distributed annually in the United States. A method of produc-
ing a more potent IPV with greater antigenic content was developed in 1978 and is the
only type of IPV in use today (51 ). The first of these more immunogenic vaccines was
licensed in the United States in 1987. Results of studies from several countries have
indicated that the enhanced-potency IPV is more immunogenic for both children and
adults than previous formulations of IPV (52 ).
Vaccine Composition
Two IPV vaccine products are licensed in the United States,* although only one
(IPOL®) is both licensed and distributed in the United States. These products and their
descriptions are as follows:
● IPOL®. One dose (0.5 mL administered subcutaneously) consists of the sterile
suspension of three types of poliovirus: type 1 (Mahoney), type 2 (MEF-1), and
type 3 (Saukett). The viruses are grown on Vero cells, a continuous line of
monkey kidney cells, by the microcarrier method. After concentration,
purification, and formaldehyde inactivation, each dose of vaccine contains 40 D
*Official names: IPOL® (enhanced-inactivated poliomyelitis vaccine), manufactured and distributed
by Aventis-Pasteur, Swiftwater, Pennsylvania; and POLIOVAX,® manufactured by Aventis-Pasteur,
Ontario, Canada (licensed but not distributed in the United States).
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antigen units of type 1 poliovirus, 8 D antigen units of type 2, and 32 D antigen
units of type 3. Each dose also contains 0.5% of 2-phenoxyethanol and up to 200
ppm of formaldehyde as preservatives, as well as trace amounts of neomycin,
streptomycin, and polymyxin B used in vaccine production. This vaccine does
not contain thimerosal.
● POLIOVAX®. One dose (0.5 mL administered subcutaneously) consists of the
sterile suspension of three types of poliovirus: type 1 (Mahoney), type 2 (MEF-1),
and type 3 (Saukett). The viruses are grown on human diploid (MRC-5) cell
cultures, concentrated, purified, and formaldehyde inactivated. Each dose of
vaccine contains 40 D antigen units of type 1 poliovirus, 8 D antigen units of type
2, and 32 D antigen units of type 3, as well as 27 ppm formaldehyde, 0.5% of 2-
phenoxyethanol, 0.5% of albumin (human), 20 ppm of Tween 80™, and <1 ppm
of bovine serum. Trace amounts of neomycin and streptomycin can be present
as a result of the production process. This vaccine does not contain thimerosal.
Immunogenicity
A clinical trial of two preparations of enhanced-potency IPV was completed in the
United States in 1984 (53 ). Among children who received three doses of one of the
enhanced-potency IPVs at ages 2, 4, and 18 months, 99%–100% had developed serum
antibodies to all three poliovirus types at age 6 months, which was 2 months after
administration of the second dose. The percentage of children who had antibodies to
all three poliovirus serotypes did not increase or decrease during the 14-month period
after the second dose, confirming that seroconversion had occurred in most of the
children. Furthermore, geometric mean antibody titers increased fivefold to tenfold
after both the second and third doses.
Data from subsequent studies have confirmed that 90%–100% of children develop
protective antibodies to all three types of poliovirus after administration of two doses
of the currently available IPV, and 99%–100% develop protective antibodies after three
doses (53–55 ). Results of studies showing long-term antibody persistence after three
doses of enhanced-potency IPV are not yet available in the United States. However,
data from one study indicated that antibody persisted throughout a 4-year follow-up
period (56 ). In Sweden, studies of persons who received four doses of an IPV with
lower antigen content than the IPVs licensed in the United States indicated that >90% of
vaccinated persons had serum antibodies to poliovirus 25 years after the fourth dose
(57 ). One dose of IPV administered to persons during an outbreak of poliovirus type 1
in Senegal during 1986–1987 was 36% effective; the effectiveness of two doses was
89% (58 ).
Several European countries (e.g., Finland, Netherlands, Sweden, and Iceland) have
relied exclusively on enhanced-potency IPV for routine poliovirus vaccination to elimi-
nate the disease. More recently, all Canadian provinces have adopted vaccination sched-
ules relying exclusively on IPV (i.e., five doses at ages 2, 4, 6, and 18 months and 4–6
years), and Ontario has used an all-IPV schedule since 1988 (59 ). In addition, France
has used only IPV since 1983 (60 ).
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Safety
In countries relying on all-IPV schedules, no increased risk for serious adverse events
has been observed. An extensive review by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of adverse
events associated with vaccination suggested that no serious adverse events have been
associated with the use of IPV in these countries (61 ). Since expanded use of IPV in the
United States in 1996, no serious adverse events have been linked to use of IPV (CDC,
unpublished data, 1999).
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IPV VACCINATION
Recommendations for IPV Vaccination of Children
Routine Vaccination
All children should receive four doses of IPV at ages 2, 4, and 6–18 months and 4–6
years. The first and second doses of IPV are necessary to induce a primary immune
response, and the third and fourth doses ensure “boosting” of antibody titers to high
levels. If accelerated protection is needed, the minimum interval between doses is 4
weeks, although the preferred interval between the second and third doses is 2 months
(see Recommendations for IPV Vaccination of Adults). All children who have received
three doses of IPV before age 4 years should receive a fourth dose before or at school
entry. The fourth dose is not needed if the third dose is administered on or after the
fourth birthday.
Incompletely Vaccinated Children
The poliovirus vaccination status of children should be evaluated periodically. Those
who are inadequately protected should complete the recommended vaccination se-
ries. No additional doses are needed if more time than recommended elapses between
doses (e.g., more than 4–8 weeks between the first two doses or more than 2–14 months
between the second and third doses).
Scheduling IPV Administration
Until appropriate combination vaccines are available, the administration of IPV will
require additional injections at ages 2 and 4 months. When scheduling IPV administra-
tion, the following options should be considered to decrease the number of injections
at the 2- and 4-month patient visits:
● Administer HepB at birth and ages 1 and 6 months.
● Schedule additional visits if there is reasonable certainty that the child will be
brought back for subsequent vaccination at the recommended ages.
● Use available combination vaccines.
Interchangeability of Vaccines
Children who have initiated the poliovirus vaccination series with one or more doses
of OPV should receive IPV to complete the series. If the vaccines are administered ac-
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cording to their licensed indications for minimum ages and intervals between doses,
four doses of OPV or IPV in any combination by age 4–6 years is considered a complete
series, regardless of age at the time of the third dose. A minimum interval of 4 weeks
should elapse if IPV is administered after OPV. Available evidence indicates that per-
sons primed with OPV exhibit a strong mucosal immunogloblulin A response after
boosting with IPV (62 ).
Administration with Other Vaccines
IPV can be administered simultaneously with other routinely recommended child-
hood vaccines. These include DTP, DTaP, Hib, HepB, varicella (chickenpox) vaccine, and
measles-mumps-rubella vaccine.
Recommendations for IPV Vaccination of Adults
Routine poliovirus vaccination of adults (i.e., persons aged >18 years) residing in
the United States is not necessary. Most adults have a minimal risk for exposure to
polioviruses in the United States and most are immune as a result of vaccination dur-
ing childhood. Vaccination is recommended for certain adults who are at greater risk
for exposure to polioviruses than the general population, including the following per-
sons:
● Travelers to areas or countries where polio is epidemic or endemic.
● Members of communities or specific population groups with disease caused by
wild polioviruses.
● Laboratory workers who handle specimens that might contain polioviruses.
● Health-care workers who have close contact with patients who might be
excreting wild polioviruses.
● Unvaccinated adults whose children will be receiving oral poliovirus vaccine.
Unvaccinated adults who are at increased risk should receive a primary vaccination
series with IPV. Adults without documentation of vaccination status should be consid-
ered unvaccinated. Two doses of IPV should be administered at intervals of 4–8 weeks;
a third dose should be administered 6–12 months after the second. If three doses of IPV
cannot be administered within the recommended intervals before protection is needed,
the following alternatives are recommended:
● If more than 8 weeks are available before protection is needed, three doses of IPV
should be administered at least 4 weeks apart.
● If fewer than 8 weeks but more than 4 weeks are available before protection is
needed, two doses of IPV should be administered at least 4 weeks apart.
● If fewer than 4 weeks are available before protection is needed, a single dose of
IPV is recommended.
The remaining doses of vaccine should be administered later, at the recommended
intervals, if the person remains at increased risk for exposure to poliovirus. Adults who
have had a primary series of OPV or IPV and who are at increased risk can receive
another dose of IPV. Available data do not indicate the need for more than a single
lifetime booster dose with IPV for adults.
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Precautions and Contraindications
Hypersensitivity or Anaphylactic Reactions to IPV
or Antibiotics Contained in IPV
IPV should not be administered to persons who have experienced a severe allergic
(anaphylactic) reaction after a previous dose of IPV or to streptomycin, polymyxin B, or
neomycin. Because IPV contains trace amounts of streptomycin, polymyxin B, and neo-
mycin, hypersensitivity reactions can occur among persons sensitive to these antibiot-
ics. No serious adverse events related to use of enhanced-potency IPV have been docu-
mented.
Pregnancy
Although no adverse effects of IPV have been documented among pregnant women
or their fetuses, vaccination of pregnant women should be avoided on theoretical
grounds. However, if a pregnant woman is at increased risk for infection and requires
immediate protection against polio, IPV can be administered in accordance with the
recommended schedules for adults (see Recommendations for IPV Vaccination of
Adults).
Immunodeficiency
IPV is the only vaccine recommended for vaccination of immunodeficient persons
and their household contacts. Many immunodeficient persons are immune to poliovi-
ruses as a result of previous vaccination or exposure to wild virus when they were
immunocompetent. Administration of IPV to immunodeficient persons is safe. Although
a protective immune response in these persons cannot be ensured, IPV might confer
some protection.
False Contraindications
Breastfeeding does not interfere with successful immunization against polio. A dose
of IPV can be administered to a child who has diarrhea. Minor upper respiratory ill-
nesses with or without fever, mild to moderate local reactions to a previous dose of
vaccine, current antimicrobial therapy, and the convalescent phase of an acute illness
are not contraindications for vaccination (63 ).
ORAL POLIOVIRUS VACCINE (OPV)
Background
Routine production of OPV in the United States has been discontinued. However, an
emergency stockpile of OPV for polio outbreak control is maintained. Because OPV is
the only vaccine recommended to control outbreaks of polio, this section describes
OPV and indications for its use.
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Vaccine Composition
Trivalent OPV contains live attenuated strains of all three poliovirus serotypes. The
viruses are propagated in monkey kidney cell culture. Until introduction of the sequen-
tial IPV-OPV schedule in 1997, OPV was the nation’s primary poliovirus vaccine, after its
licensing in the United States in 1963. One dose of OPV (0.5 mL administered orally
from a single dose dispenser) is required to contain a minimum of 106 TCID50 (tissue
culture infectious dose) Sabin strain of poliovirus type 1 (LSc 2ab), 105.1 TCID50 Sabin
strain of poliovirus type 2 (P712 Ch 2ab), and 105.8 TCID50 Sabin strain of poliovirus type
3 (Leon 12a1b), balanced in a formulation of 10:1:3, respectively. The OPV formerly
manufactured in the United States* contained approximately threefold to tenfold the
minimum dose of virus necessary to meet these requirements consistently (64 ). Each
dose of 0.5 mL also contained <25 µG each of streptomycin and neomycin.
Immunogenicity
After complete primary vaccination with three doses of OPV, >95% of recipients
develop long-lasting (probably lifelong) immunity to all three poliovirus types. Approxi-
mately 50% of vaccine recipients develop antibodies to all three serotypes after a single
dose of OPV (53 ). OPV consistently induces immunity of the gastrointestinal tract that
provides a substantial degree of resistance to reinfection with poliovirus. OPV inter-
feres with subsequent infection by wild poliovirus, a property that is important in vac-
cination campaigns to control polio epidemics. Both IPV and OPV induce immunity of
the mucosa of the gastrointestinal tract, but the mucosal immunity induced by OPV is
superior (65,66 ). Both IPV and OPV are effective in reducing pharyngeal replication and
subsequent transmission of poliovirus by the oral-oral route.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OPV VACCINATION
Recommendations for OPV Vaccination for Outbreak Control
Rationale
As affirmed by ACIP, OPV remains the vaccine of choice for mass vaccination to
control polio outbreaks (16 ). Data from clinical trials and empirical evidence support
the effectiveness of OPV for outbreak control. The preference for OPV in an outbreak
setting is supported by a) higher seroconversion rates after a single dose of OPV com-
pared with a single dose of IPV; b) a greater degree of intestinal immunity, which limits
community spread of wild poliovirus; and c) beneficial secondary spread (intestinal
shedding) of vaccine virus, which improves overall protection in the community.
As a live attenuated virus, OPV replicates in the intestinal tract and induces antibod-
ies in more recipients after a single dose. Thus, OPV can protect more persons who are
susceptible in a population, making it the preferred vaccine for rapid intervention dur-
ing an outbreak (53,67 ). Among persons previously vaccinated with three doses of IPV
*Official name: Orimune® (poliovirus vaccine, live, oral, trivalent types 1,2,3 [Sabin]), manufactured
by Lederle Laboratories, Division of American Cyanamid Company, Pearl River, New York.
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or OPV, excretion of poliovirus from the pharynx and the intestine appears most closely
correlated with titers of homologous humoral antibody (68 ). Three doses of either IPV
or OPV induce protective antibody levels (neutralizing antibody titers >1:8) to all three
serotypes of poliovirus in >95% of infant recipients (9 ). Therefore, boosting of immu-
nity with a single dose of OPV or IPV is likely to reduce both pharyngeal and intestinal
excretion of poliovirus, effectively stopping epidemic transmission of wild poliovirus.
Use of  OPV for Outbreak Control
OPV has been the vaccine of choice for polio outbreak control. During a polio out-
break in Albania in 1996, the number of cases decreased 90% within 2 weeks after
administration of a single dose of OPV to >80% of the population aged 0–50 years. Two
weeks after a second round of vaccination with OPV, no additional cases were observed
(69 ). Rapidly implemented mass vaccination campaigns resulting in high coverage
appears to have been similarly effective in interrupting wild poliovirus outbreaks in
other countries (70 ).
European countries that rely solely on IPV for routine poliovirus vaccination (e.g.,
the Netherlands and Finland) have also used OPV for primary control of outbreaks.
During the 1992–93 polio outbreak in the Netherlands, OPV was offered to members of
a religious community affected by the outbreak (who were largely unvaccinated before
the outbreak) and other persons living in areas affected by the outbreak. IPV was given
to immunized persons outside the outbreak areas to ensure protection in this popula-
tion (71 ). During a 1984–85 polio outbreak in Finland, 1.5 million doses of IPV initially
were administered to children <18 years for immediate boosting of protection (72 ).
Later, approximately 4.8 million doses of OPV were administered to 95% of the popula-
tion. In contrast, mass vaccination with IPV exclusively has had little impact on out-
breaks and has rarely been used since OPV became available (70,73 ).
Recommendations for Other Uses of OPV
For the remaining nonemergency supplies of OPV, only the following indications
are acceptable for OPV administration:
● Unvaccinated children who will be traveling in fewer than 4 weeks to areas where
polio is endemic. If OPV is not available, IPV should be administered.
● Children of parents who do not accept the recommended number of vaccine
injections. These children can receive OPV only for the third or fourth dose or
both. In this situation, health-care providers should administer OPV only after
discussing the risk for VAPP with parents or caregivers.
Precautions and Contraindications
Hypersensitivity or Anaphylactic Reactions to OPV
OPV should not be administered to persons who have experienced an anaphylactic
reaction to a previous dose of OPV. Because OPV also contains trace amounts of neo-
mycin and streptomycin, hypersensitivity reactions can occur in persons sensitive to
these antibiotics.
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Pregnancy
Although no adverse effects of OPV have been documented among pregnant women
or their fetuses, vaccination of pregnant women should be avoided. However, if a preg-
nant woman requires immediate protection against polio, she can receive OPV in ac-
cordance with the recommended schedules for adults (see Use of OPV for Outbreak
Control).
Immunodeficiency
OPV should not be administered to persons who have immunodeficiency disorders
(e.g., severe combined immunodeficiency syndrome, agammaglobulinemia, or
hypogammaglobulinemia) (74–76 ) because these persons are at substantially increased
risk for VAPP. Similarly, OPV should not be administered to persons with altered im-
mune systems resulting from malignant disease (e.g., leukemia, lymphoma, or gener-
alized malignancy) or to persons whose immune systems have been compromised
(e.g., by therapy with corticosteroids, alkylating drugs, antimetabolites, or radiation or
by infection with human immunodeficiency virus [HIV]). OPV should not be used to
vaccinate household contacts of immunodeficient patients; IPV is recommended. Many
immunodeficient persons are immune to polioviruses as a result of previous vaccina-
tion or exposure to wild virus when they were immunocompetent. Although their risk
for paralytic disease could be lower than for persons with congenital or acquired im-
munodeficiency disorders, these persons should not receive OPV.
Inadvertent Administration of OPV to Household Contacts
of Immunodeficient Persons
If OPV is inadvertently administered to a household contact of an immunodeficient
person, the OPV recipient should avoid close contact with the immunodeficient person
for approximately 4–6 weeks after vaccination. If this is not feasible, rigorous hygiene
and hand washing after contact with feces (e.g., after diaper changing) and avoidance
of contact with saliva (e.g., sharing food or utensils) can be an acceptable but probably
less effective alternative. Maximum excretion of vaccine virus occurs within 4 weeks
after oral vaccination.
False Contraindications
Breastfeeding does not interfere with successful immunization against polio. A dose
of OPV can be administered to a child who has mild diarrhea. Minor upper respiratory
illnesses with or without fever, mild to moderate local reactions to a previous dose of
vaccine, current antimicrobial therapy, and the convalescent phase of an acute illness
are not contraindications for vaccination (63 ).
Adverse Reactions
Vaccine-Associated Paralytic Poliomyelitis (VAPP)
In rare instances, administration of OPV has been associated with paralysis in healthy
recipients and their contacts. No procedures are available for identifying persons (other
than those with immunodeficiency) who are at risk for such adverse reactions. Although
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the risk for VAPP is minimal, vaccinees (or their parents) and their susceptible, close,
personal contacts should be informed of this risk (Table). Administration of OPV can
cause VAPP that results in death, although this is rare (3,45 ).
Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS)
Available evidence indicates that administration of OPV does not measurably in-
crease the risk for GBS, a type of ascending inflammatory polyneuritis. Preliminary
findings from two studies in Finland led to a contrary conclusion in a review conducted
by IOM in 1993 (77,78 ). Investigators in Finland reported an apparent increase in GBS
incidence that was temporally associated with a mass vaccination campaign during
which OPV was administered to children and adults who had previously been vacci-
nated with IPV. However, after the IOM review, these data were reanalyzed, and an
observational study was completed in the United States. Neither the reanalysis nor the
new study provided evidence of a causal relationship between OPV administration and
GBS (79 ).
REPORTING OF ADVERSE EVENTS AFTER VACCINATION
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 requires health-care providers to
report serious adverse events after poliovirus vaccination (80 ). Events that must be
reported are detailed in the Reportable Events Table of this act and include paralytic
polio and any acute complications or sequelae of paralytic polio. Adverse events should
be reported to the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS). VAERS report-
ing forms and information are available 24 hours a day by calling (800) 822-7967.
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, established by the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, provides a mechanism through which compen-
sation can be paid on behalf of a person who died or was injured as a result of receiving
vaccine. A Vaccine Injury Table lists the vaccines covered by this program and the inju-
ries, disabilities, illnesses, and conditions (including death) for which compensation
can be paid (81 ). This program provides potential compensation after development or
onset of VAPP in a) an OPV recipient (within 30 days), b) a person in contact with an
OPV vaccinee (no time frame specified), or c) an immunodeficient person (within 6
months). Additional information is available from the National Vaccine Injury Compen-
sation Program ([800] 338-2382) or CDC’s National Immunization Program Internet site
at the following address: <http://www.cdc.gov/nip/vaers.htm>.
CONCLUSION
In 1997, ACIP recommended using a sequential schedule of IPV followed by OPV for
routine childhood polio vaccination in the United States, replacing the previous all-OPV
vaccination schedule. This change was intended to reduce the risk for VAPP. Since 1997,
the global polio eradication initiative has progressed rapidly, and the likelihood of po-
liovirus importation into the United States has decreased substantially. The sequential
schedule has been well accepted, and no declines in childhood immunization coverage
have been observed. On the basis of these data, ACIP recommended on June 17, 1999,
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an all-IPV schedule for routine childhood polio vaccination in the United States to elimi-
nate the risk for VAPP. ACIP also reaffirms its support for the global polio eradication
initiative and the use of OPV as the only vaccine recommended to eradicate polio from
the remaining countries where polio is endemic.
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GOALS and OBJECTIVES
This MMWR provides recommendations regarding the prevention of poliomyelitis in the United States. These
recommendations were developed by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). The goal of
this report is to provide guidance on the use of poliovirus vaccine in the United States. Upon completion of this
educational activity, the reader should be able to a) describe the epidemiology of polio in the United States, b)
describe the current recommendations for routine poliovirus vaccination in the United States, c) recognize
contraindications and precautions to the use of inactivated poliovirus vaccine, and d) list the major components
of the global polio eradication program.
To receive continuing education credit, please answer all of the following questions.
1. Which of the following statements is not true concerning the clinical features of acute polio?
A. Most poliovirus infections are asymptomatic.
B. Paralytic polio results from viral replication in the cortex of the brain.
C. Spinal paralysis from poliovirus is usually asymmetric.
D. Many patients recover some muscle function after the acute episode.
E. Paralytic polio is fatal in 2%–10% of cases.
2. Which of the following statements best describes the current epidemiology of poliovirus
infection in the United States?
A. Outbreaks of polio occur approximately every 10 years.
B. Transmission of poliovirus occurs only among unvaccinated preschool-aged children.
C. Outbreaks of polio occur because of importation of poliovirus from outside the United
States.
D. All paralytic polio reported in the United States since 1993 has been the result of live
attenuated oral poliovirus vaccine.
E. No paralytic polio has been reported in the United States since 1985.
3. Which of the following statements is true regarding inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV)?
A. IPV contains three serotypes of poliovirus.
B. Approximately 90% of recipients develop antibodies to all vaccine serotypes after two
doses of IPV.
C. IPV should be administered subcutaneously.
D. IPV can contain trace amounts of streptomycin and neomycin.
E. All of the above statements concerning IPV are true.
4. Which of the following statements is true regarding vaccine-associated paralytic
poliomyelitis (VAPP) in the United States?
A. The overall risk for VAPP is approximately 1 case per 100,000 doses distributed.
B. VAPP occurs only among recipients of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV).
C. The risk for VAPP is >7 times greater after the first dose of OPV than after any subsequent
dose.
D. Persons with T-cell immunodeficiency are at the highest risk for VAPP.
E. VAPP has been reported after receipt of both OPV and IPV.
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5. Which of the following is a component of the global polio eradication strategy?
A. Maintaining high vaccination coverage among children aged <1 year.
B. Sensitive surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis.
C. Supplemental poliovirus vaccination of children during National Immunization Days.
D. Localized vaccination campaigns in areas at high risk for outbreaks.
E. All of the above are components of the global polio eradication strategy.
6. What poliovirus vaccination schedule is recommended for children in the United States?
A. Two doses of IPV followed by two doses of OPV.
B. Two doses of OPV followed by two doses of IPV.
C. Four doses of IPV.
D. Four doses of OPV.
E. Poliovirus vaccination is no longer routinely recommended for children in the United
States.
7. Which of the following conditions is a valid contraindication or precaution to using IPV?
A. Severe allergic reaction to a previous dose of IPV or to a vaccine component.
B. Breastfeeding.
C. Significant immunodeficiency from any cause.
D. Current administration of antibiotics.
E. All of the above are valid contraindications or precautions to the use of IPV.
8. What is the most common serious adverse event after administration of IPV?
A. Fever.
B. VAPP.
C. Allergic reactions (e.g., angioedema).
D. Guillain-Barré syndrome.
E. No serious adverse events have been associated with IPV use.
9. For which of the following groups of adults is polio vaccination recommended?
A. All unvaccinated adults born during or since 1957.
B. All health-care workers.
C. Adults with occupational exposure to sewage.
D. Travelers to areas where poliovirus infection is epidemic or endemic.
E. All of the above groups of adults.
10. Indicate your work setting.
A. State/local health department.
B. Other public health setting.
C. Hospital clinic/private practice.
D. Managed care organization.
E. Academic institution.
F. Other.
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11. Which best describes your professional activities?
A. Patient care — emergency/urgent care department.
B. Patient care — inpatient.




12. I plan to use these recommendations as the basis for . . .  (Indicate all that apply.)
A. health education materials.
B. insurance reimbursement policies.
C. local practice guidelines.
D. public policy.
E. other.







14. How much time did you spend reading this report and completing the exam?
A. 1–1.5 hours.
B. More than 1.5 hours but fewer than 2 hours.
C. 2–2.5 hours.
D. More than 2.5 hours.




C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
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16. After reading this report, I am confident I can describe the current recommendations for
routine poliovirus vaccination in the United States.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
17. After reading this report, I am confident I can recognize contraindications and precautions
to the use of inactivated poliovirus vaccine.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.




C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
19. The objectives are relevant to the goal of this report.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
20. The table and figure are useful.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
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21. Overall, the presentation of the report enhanced my ability to understand the material.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
22. These recommendations will affect my practice.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
Correct answers for questions 1–9.
1. B; 2. D; 3. E; 4. C; 5. E; 6. C; 7. A; 8. E; 9. D.
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